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Abstract Bootstrap financing refers to measures
that entrepreneurial ventures undertake to preserve
liquidity (e.g., reducing expenses, collecting re-
ceivables, delaying payments, preselling). Prior re-
search shows that bootstrap financing is an impor-
tant enabler for the growth of resource-constrained
early-stage ventures. However, little is known
about the use of bootstrap financing in crises,
during which the preservation of liquidity is par-
ticularly salient. We investigate the determinants of
bootstrap financing in the 2020 COVID-19 crisis
using a sample of 17,046 German entrepreneurial
ventures. We formulate hypotheses about the de-
terminants of bootstrap financing from a necessity,
human capital, and opportunity cost perspective.
Among others, our results show that the severity
of the crisis for the venture, the level of private
consumption, and self-employment experience are
positively associated with an increased use of
bootstrap financing measures. Our study contrib-
utes to the literature on bootstrap financing and
illuminates how entrepreneurial ventures maintain
liquidity in crises.
Plain English Summary Economic downturns or crises
often lead to financial distress for ventures. To survive
such tumultuous times, ventures need to preserve their
liquidity. Bootstrap financing refers to measures that en-
trepreneurial ventures take to preserve liquidity (like send-
ing payment reminders, paying invoices later, reducing tax
advances, reducing commercial rent). Because little is
known about how bootstrap financing is used during
crises, we investigate how it was used during the
COVID-19 crisis. Our study builds on a survey of
17,046 German entrepreneurial ventures and self-
employed individuals. We find that the use of bootstrap
financing is positively related to how severe the crisis was
for the venture along with the level of private consumption
and self-employment experience of the venture’s owner. In
contrast, a negative association exists with private liquidity,
business liquidity, how long before the owner retires, and
part-time self-employment. The positive association be-
tween self-employment experience and bootstrap financ-
ing indicates that targeted entrepreneurship education pro-
grams or webinars should focus on inexperienced entre-
preneurs so that these individuals are prepared to use
bootstrapping methods to maintain liquidity during crises.
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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurial ventures engage in bootstrap financing
to preserve a critical level of liquidity. Maintaining
liquidity is especially important in economic downturns
or crises, which often lead to financial distress for ven-
tures (e.g., Ebben 2009; Neeley and Van Auken 2010).
Typical measures of bootstrap financing include reduc-
ing expenses, collecting receivables more quickly,
delaying payments, and preselling (e.g., Winborg and
Landström 2001).
While the use of bootstrap financing is an established
strategy for entrepreneurial ventures, little is known
about the use of bootstrap financing in crises, in which
the preservation of liquidity is especially critical for
venture survival (e.g., Grichnik et al. 2014). So far, prior
research has mainly focused on bootstrapping as a stra-
tegic practice for venture growth (e.g., Harrison et al.
2004; Vanacker et al. 2011). Against this background,
we address the following research question: Which fac-
tors determine the use of bootstrap financing measures
during economic crises?
We enrich prior research by investigating the deter-
minants of bootstrap financing during the COVID-19
crises. The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic led to a severe
economic downturn that affected most entrepreneurial
ventures and their financial situation due to interrupted
supply chains, reduced demand, and a generally uncer-
tain environment (Nicola et al. 2020). To address our
research question, we use a survey of 17,046 German
entrepreneurial ventures and self-employed individuals
that was conducted in the middle of the COVID-19
crisis. Conceptually, we formulate hypotheses about
the determinants of bootstrap financing from a necessi-
ty, human capital, and opportunity cost perspective.
We identify a positive relationship between the se-
verity of the crisis and the use of bootstrapping. In line
with our hypotheses, we show that the severity of the
crisis for the venture, the level of private consumption,
and self-employment experience are positively associat-
ed with an increased use of bootstrap financing mea-
sures. In contrast, a negative association exists with
private liquidity, business liquidity, a shorter time to
retirement, and part-time self-employment.
We make three contributions to the literature. First,
we contribute to the literature on bootstrap financing in
entrepreneurship (e.g., Grichnik et al. 2014; Harrison
et al. 2004; Jonsson and Lindbergh 2013; Vanacker
et al. 2011;Winborg and Landström 2001). Specifically,
we investigate the determinants of bootstrap financing
in crises, which is closely related to prior research on the
use of internal bootstrapping methods for self-financing
(e.g., Grichnik et al. 2014; Winborg and Landström
2001). We contribute to this research by explaining
how necessity, human capital, and opportunity cost
characteristics influence the use of such internal boot-
strap financing methods. Second, we add to previous
literature on entrepreneurship in crises (e.g., Brown
et al. 2020; Davidsson and Gordon 2016; Fairlie and
Krashinsky 2012; Kuckertz et al. 2020; Marino et al.
2008; Snyder 2004; Thorgren and Williams 2020). We
show, for example, that the more severe the situation is
for the self-employed and their entrepreneurial ventures,
the greater the number of bootstrap financing measures
used to mitigate the negative consequences of the crisis.
Third, we contribute to research linking human capital
theory and entrepreneurial finance (e.g., Davidsson and
Honig 2003; Liu et al. 2018). While our results on the
use of bootstrap financing in crises similarize prior
research on entrepreneurial experience and access to
capital (e.g., Robinson and Sexton 1994), the results
contrast Grichnik et al. (2014) since we do not find
support for a positive effect of education on the extent
to which bootstrap financing is applied in crises.
2 Related literature
2.1 Prior research on bootstrap financing
Prior research has extensively discussed how financial
bootstrapping can enable entrepreneurs and small firms
to overcome financial constraints (e.g., Carter and Van
Auken 2005; Ebben and Johnson 2006; Grichnik et al.
2014; Harrison et al. 2004; Jonsson and Lindbergh
2013; Vanacker et al. 2011; Winborg and Landström
2001). Specifically, financial bootstrapping is used in
situations where entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial ven-
tures require (financial) resources without relying on
long-term external funding (e.g., Ebben and Johnson
2006; Grichnik et al. 2014; Winborg and Landström
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2001). Instead, they acquire resources and preserve
liquidity through financial bootstrapping (e.g., Freear
et al. 1995; Harrison et al. 2004; Van Auken and Neeley
1996).
Different measures of financial bootstrapping ex-
ist. Grichnik et al. (2014) identify customer-related,
joint resource utilization, internal self-financing, and
temporary resource methods of bootstrapping. Since
bootstrap financing in crises is shaped by liquidity
bottlenecks, internal self-financing methods of
bootstrapping are of major importance. Examples
of such internal bootstrapping methods are the fol-
lowing: (1) obtaining loans from relatives, (2) using
of own credit card, (3) withholding the entrepre-
neur’s own salary, (4) delaying payments to sup-
pliers, and (5) delaying payments of taxes (e.g.,
Grichnik et al. 2014).
Prior research documents differences in financial
bootstrapping between smaller and larger firms.
Harrison et al. (2004) show that smaller firms use finan-
cial bootstrapping to reduce costs, whereas larger firms
tend to exploit value-chain-based relationships with
customers or suppliers. These findings are consistent
with the findings of Ebben and Johnson (2006), who
indicate that ventures increase their use of customer-
related bootstrapping measures over time. Research also
shows that many businesses use financial bootstrapping
to decrease the need for external capital, in particular in
early venture stages (e.g., Harrison et al. 2004; Kim
et al. 2006).
Additionally, prior studies outline different out-
comes of use of financial bootstrapping measures
(e.g., Grichnik et al. 2014; Jonsson and Lindbergh
2013; Vanacker et al. 2011). First, entrepreneurs or
small businesses that rely on financial bootstrapping
activities exhibit higher growth over time (e.g., Brush
et al. 2006; Vanacker et al. 2011). For example,
Vanacker et al. (2011) find that certain bootstrapping
measures (e.g., hiring more interim personnel, en-
couraging customers to pay sooner) lead to growth
in the long term. Second, bootstrapping activities
help entrepreneurial firms develop social capital
(Jonsson and Lindbergh 2013). Also, Grichnik et al.
(2014) find that human and social capital lead to
higher usage of financial bootstrapping. Therefore,
the authors suggest that business training and an
extension of the entrepreneurial network can support
small businesses and enable them to better overcome
financial constraints.
2.2 Bootstrap financing and economic crises
While different measures and outcomes of financial
bootstrapping have been widely investigated, little re-
search exists regarding bootstrap financing in crises
(e.g., Ebben 2009; Neeley and Van Auken 2010). How-
ever, internal methods of self-financing, such as boot-
strap financing, are of particular importance in times of
great uncertainty. Crises are often characterized by a
demand reduction as well as liquidity constraints, which
in turn leads to an increased need for bootstrap
financing.
While we were unable to identify prior research on
the determinants of the use of bootstrap financing in
crises, several studies indicate that the use of bootstrap
financing measures is a critical tool for entrepreneurial
ventures in terms of economic distress. For example,
Winborg and Landström (2001) identify a cluster of
ventures which they label “delaying bootstrappers.”
These ventures are characterized by a business with a
need for additional finances and use bootstrapping, for
example, to delay different payments. They point out
that such measures may serve as a relevant tool to
survive as an entrepreneurial venture in crises. Ebben
(2009) extends the study of Winborg and Landström
(2001) and confirms that small firms that are illiquid or
underperforming (“delaying bootstrappers”) use specif-
ic bootstrapping approaches more often. The author
further argues that “empirical and anecdotal evidence
suggests that small firms bootstrap out of necessity
rather than proactively” (Ebben 2009, p. 349), which
speaks to an increased usage of bootstrap financing in
crises. Finally, Neeley and Van Auken (2010) explore
gender differences in the use of bootstrapping within
crises (i.e., the 2008/09 financial crisis). They argue that
female business owners might be more likely to apply
bootstrap financing since their business activities are
probably more affected by a crisis than those of their
male counterparts. This is in line with recent findings on
the COVID-19 crisis, which also affects female entre-
preneurs more severely (e.g., HÉTFA 2020).
3 Hypotheses: determinants of bootstrap financing
in crises
We investigate the use of bootstrap financing by self-
employed individuals in crises. Specifically, we develop
hypotheses about the determinants of bootstrap
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financing from three perspectives, namely, (1) a neces-
sity, (2) human capital, and (3) an opportunity cost
perspective.
3.1 Necessity perspective
Even though the effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the
business models and revenues of entrepreneurial ven-
tures are generally negative, some heterogeneity exists.
While some sectors flourish (e.g., online retailing), most
ventures are negatively affected by the economic crisis.
Therefore, we argue that entrepreneurial ventures that
are more severely affected by the COVID-19 crises will
more intensively look for opportunities since they face a
necessity to ensure survival.
The preservation of liquidity, which is the main goal
of bootstrap financing, is of crucial importance to ensure
survival (e.g., Winborg and Landström 2001). Previous
literature shows that entrepreneurs use bootstrap financ-
ing in crises to acquire necessary resources (Ebben
2009), although this often implicates the exploitation
of others’ resources (Harrison et al. 2004; Malmström
2014). Since this hurdle of exploiting third parties exists,
we argue that that entrepreneurial ventures who are
more severely affected by the COVID-19 crisis are
willing to engage in a greater amount of financial
bootstrapping.
We assume that the degree of affectedness of a busi-
ness within a crisis is determined by two factors. First,
revenue decreases indicate the severity of the crisis for
the respective entrepreneurial venture. If revenues de-
crease in a crisis and the costs remain at the same level,
businesses face an immediate threat of bankruptcy and
are thus forced to engage in bootstrap financing. Sec-
ond, the amount of existing business liquidity deter-
mines how long the venture can overcome financial
bottlenecks. Businesses need to maintain liquidity to
meet short-term financial obligations. For example, em-
ployees need to receive their salary and monthly rents
require payment. Thus, we assume that lower levels of
liquidity in crises force ventures to more heavily engage
in bootstrap financing. Our hypothesis is twofold:
H1a. A larger decrease in revenue is associated with
an increased use of bootstrap financing mea-
sures in crises.
H1b. A larger amount of business liquidity is associ-
ated with a decreased use of bootstrap financing
measures in crises.
3.2 Human capital perspective
Our second set of hypotheses takes a human capital
perspective and focuses on the entrepreneurial venture’s
current CEO (i.e., the entrepreneur). Prior research in
entrepreneurship and management shows that the CEO
and their human capital characteristics are of crucial
importance for firms’ strategic decisions (for a
comprehensive review, see Liu et al. 2018). Similarly,
prior entrepreneurship research shows that characteris-
tics, such as entrepreneurial experience and education,
matter for entrepreneurial behavior (e.g., Davidsson and
Honig 2003; Robinson and Sexton 1994).
Prior bootstrapping research shows that entrepre-
neurial experience influences the likelihood of bootstrap
financing (Winborg 2009). For example, Grichnik et al.
(2014) show that entrepreneurs with higher managerial
experience also use bootstrap financing more often. This
is because these experiences provide them with better
skills and a higher awareness of available resources. In
line with this research, we argue that self-employed
individuals with extensive entrepreneurial experience
are more skilled in financial matters and have a better
knowledge of the different financial instruments that
exist to maintain liquidity. Hence, they should also have
a higher likelihood to use bootstrap financing in crises in
which the preservation of liquidity is of utmost impor-
tance. We hypothesize:
H2a. More self-employment experience of the entre-
preneur is associated with an increased use of
bootstrap financing measures in crises.
Besides, various studies in entrepreneurial finance
show that education and access to external financing
are closely linked (e.g., Bates 1990; Carter et al. 2003;
Coleman and Cohn 2000; Franke et al. 2006; Gartner
et al. 2012). For example, Carter et al. (2003) demon-
strate a positive relationship between the degree of
education and financial resource acquisition of self-
employed individuals. A frequent explanation is that
individuals with a higher level of education, especially
those with an academic education (i.e., a university
degree), have greater cognitive capabilities and are
more prone to change and adapting to uncertain
environments. Furthermore, Grichnik et al. (2014) em-
phasize that academic education increases the likelihood
to engage in bootstrapping. Since bootstrap financing
has various facets, a higher degree of education should
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also be connected to a higher knowledge about different
bootstrapping possibilities. Therefore, we assume that
individuals with a higher level of education are also
more likely to employ bootstrap financing activities in
crises. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
H2b. A higher level of education of the entrepreneur is
associated with an increased use of bootstrap
financing measures in crises.
3.3 Opportunity cost perspective
Our third set of hypotheses takes an opportunity cost
perspective. Opportunity costs describe decisions that
result in the loss of an available advantage through an
alternative decision. Prior research explores different
facets of entrepreneurship activities and opportunity
costs (e.g., Amit et al. 1995; Kerins et al. 2004; Shane
and Venkataraman 2000; Shane 2001) and utilizes op-
portunity costs to explain the loss of alternatives for self-
employed individuals. For example, Amit et al. (1995)
document a negative relationship between opportunity
costs and entrepreneurial activities. Similarly, Lévesque
and Minniti (2006) show that younger individuals more
often start new businesses than older individuals due to
different opportunity costs of time.
In line with this research, we argue that the entrepre-
neurial behavior of full-time and part-time entrepreneurs
in crises should differ based on opportunity costs. Cri-
ses, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, increase the
uncertainty associated with entrepreneurship. Accord-
ingly, the opportunity cost of pursuing entrepreneurship
increase for part-time entrepreneurs with a wage job
next to their entrepreneurial venture. Of course, paid
employment opportunities are also affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic. This, however, should not be to
the same extent as many governments like the German
one help firms to maintain their jobs. Furthermore, part-
time entrepreneurs often have the opportunity to switch
to university, retire, or even take time off, which also
increase the opportunity costs of pursuing entrepreneur-
ship. As a result, individuals who are part-time self-
employed are less willing to commit to and invest in
an entrepreneurial career path. In contrast, full-time
entrepreneurs mostly lack an available alternative within
a crisis. Full-time entrepreneurs are more locked-in in
their businesses since they have all their know-how
bundled in the business. This leads us to the assumption
that the use of bootstrap financing to maintain liquidity
and manage venture survival becomes less likely for
part-time entrepreneurs, while full time entrepreneurs
will more heavily engage in bootstrap financing to en-
sure business survival. We hypothesize:
H3a. Compared to part-time self-employment, full-
time self-employment is associated with an in-
creased use of bootstrap financing measures in
crises.
Solo self-employed individuals account for a large
and often underestimated proportion of all self-
employed individuals (e.g., Lechmann and Schnabel
2014; Lechmann and Wunder 2017). They do not have
employees and are also referred to as “own account
workers” or “solo entrepreneurs” (e.g., De Vries et al.
2020; Van Stel and De Vries 2015). In Germany, for
example, approximately 9% of the working population
is self-employed (Eurostat 2019); solo self-employed
individuals account for 50% of these individuals
(Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2018).
However, there is a gap of knowledge of whether solo
self-employed individuals behave differently in crises.
Regarding the opportunity costs in crisis, solo self-
employed and their employer counterparts differ. Spe-
cifically, solo self-employed individuals have lower
opportunity costs in those situations since those individ-
uals have no employees to take care of and therefore
lower hurdles to quit the business. Furthermore, self-
employed individuals with further employees have a
higher emotional involvement in their entrepreneurial
ventures since they do not want their employees to lose
their jobs (Yamakawa and Cardon 2017). Hence, they
will bemore willing tomore heavily engage in bootstrap
financing to preserve venture survival. We hypothesize:
H3b. Compared to self-employment with employees,
solo self-employment is associated with a de-
creased use of bootstrap financing measures in
crises.
Finally, prior research investigates how entrepreneur-
ial behavior changes with increasing age (e.g., Azoulay
et al. 2020; Kautonen et al. 2014; Kerr and Armstrong-
Stassen 2011; Lévesque and Minniti 2006). A major
factor for changing entrepreneurial behavior is the op-
portunity costs of time. Lévesque and Minniti (2006)
thus demonstrate that aging goes along with a
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decreasing willingness to start a new venture due to
higher opportunity costs of time. Also, handling infor-
mation becomes harder with increasing age which can
lead to reluctance to explore new avenues that require
the gathering of new information (e.g., Bantel and Jack-
son 1989).
Thus, we argue that aging affects the use of bootstrap
financing in crises. Since the value of time is higher and
the risk propensity decreases (e.g., Hambrick and Ma-
son 1984) if self-employed individuals get closer to
retirement or if they are already retired, we assume that
these individuals fight less hard for maintaining their
business. Thus, we hypothesize:
H3c. A higher age of the entrepreneur is associated
with a decreased use of bootstrap financing
measures in crises.
4 Context, data, and methods
4.1 Context: the COVID-19 crisis in Germany
Our study is based on a primary dataset, which we
collected via a survey in April and May, 2020. We
conducted the survey while the COVID-19 crisis was
in full effect in Germany andwhile Germanys’ economy
was mostly locked down. Although Germany had a
lower mortality rate than various other countries at this
time (e.g., Bennhold 2020), over 130,000 people were
already infected. The German government took many
steps to contain the virus, which in turn had a severe
impact on the German economy. At the time of the
survey, a GDP decline between 4.5 and 9% is expected
for the year 2020 (IFW Kiel 2020).
The German government introduced several
supporting mechanisms to mitigate the economic con-
sequences of the crisis. These measures included a
crisis-related law regarding short-time work compensa-
tion, which allowed companies to maintain their work-
force since Germany’s Federal Employment Office
would pay workers at least 60% of their basic income
(e.g., Taylor and Schwartz 2020). Also, Germany
launched a €750 bn. economic aid package of which
€50 bn. was directed to solo entrepreneurs and
microenterprises (e.g., Nienaber 2020). Based on this
program, self-employed individuals who were able to
demonstrate acute liquidity shortfalls and that had up to
five employees were able to receive immediate financial
assistance of €9000, and those with up to ten employees
were able to receive €15,000 for the following 3 months
(Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
2020). These governmental programs were necessary
because initial evidence shows that many self-
employed individuals faced severe declines in income
(e.g., Bertschek and Erdsiek 2020; Kritikos et al. 2020).
Figure 1 describes the chronological sequence of the
crisis and its consequences for Germany until our data
collection was concluded. On January 27, the first per-
son was contracted the coronavirus (e.g., Deutsche
Welle 2020). Over the following months, different ma-
jor events followed. For example, restaurants, shops,
and schools were closed, and a curfew was imposed.
On March 22, when the curfew was declared, 24,900
people had already been infected in Germany (John
Hopkins University 2020). The curfew was partially
loosened at the beginning of May.
4.2 Sample and survey
Our online survey covered a broad range of topics
related to COVID-19 and captured individuals’ charac-
teristics, businesses’ characteristics, and the individual
consequences of the pandemic. The survey was distrib-
uted via the Association of Founders and Self-employed
Individuals in Germany (“Verband der Gründer und
Selbstständigen Deutschland”, VDSG), which is one
of the largest associations representing self-employed
individuals in Germany. The VDSG sent personalized
e-mails to its members and promoted the survey in its
newsletters and through other associations representing
self-employed individuals in Germany. Responses were
collected between April 7 and May 4, 2020.
The survey was completed by 21,774 respondents.
Due to the time-sensitive nature of the topic, we
distributed the survey via a snowballing approach to
maximize the number of responses. Therefore, we are
unable to determine an accurate response rate. We
excluded respondents with missing information for
any of the variables considered in our analysis, which
mainly resulted in dropout due to variables derived
from questions that measured respondents’ wealth
and business solvency. Such questions were not man-
datory responses and were skipped by some respon-
dents. The final estimation sample comprises 17,046
respondents (Table 1).
J. H. Block et al.





Count variable that measures the number of bootstrapping measures used by the respondent. Responses include:
(a) sending payment reminders, (b) paying invoices later, (c) reducing tax advances, (d) reducing health
insurance contribution, (e) reducing commercial rent, (f) reducing private rent
Independent variables
Revenue dummies Set of dummy variables that capture the revenue change of the respondent’s business. Dummies include (a)
stable/increased revenue or revenue decrease by (b) 100%, (c) 76 to 99%, (d) 51 to 75%, (e) 26 to 50%, and (f)
1 to 25% (serves as the reference category in the regression analysis)
Solvency dummies Set of dummy variables that capture the solvency of the respondent’s business. Dummies include (a) insolvent,
(b) solvent for 1 to 6 months, (c) solvent for 7 to 12 months, and (d) more than 12 months (serves as the
reference category in the regression analysis)
Self-employment
experience
Ordinal variable that captures the respondents self-employment experience in years (1 = 1–4, 2 = 5–10,
3 = 11–20, 4 = 21–30, 5 > 30)
Academic education Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent received an academic education at university, zero otherwise
Full-time SE Dummy variable that captures whether the respondent is working full-time (= 1) or part-time (= 0)
Solo SE Dummy variable that captures whether the respondent is working solo (= 1) or with employees (= 0)
Age Set of dummy variables that captures the age of the respondent. Dummies include (a) < 30 years, (b) 30–39 years,
(c) 40–49 years, (d) 50–59, (e) > 59 years
Control variables
Female Dummy variable that captures whether the self-employed is female (= 1) or not (= 0)
Risk attitude Ordinal variable that captures the individual’s risk attitude in entrepreneurial decision-making (1 = very low,
5 = very high)
Household size Number of persons living in the respondent’s household (including the respondent), scaled from 1 to > 5




Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent mostly works from home, zero otherwise
Wealth Ordinal variable that captures the respondent’s private wealth, that can be liquidated in the short term, in € (1 = 0;
2 = 30,000; 3 = 60,000; 4 = 90,000; 5 = 120,000; 6 = 150,000; 7 = 180,000; 8 = 210,000; 9 = 500,000;
10 = > 500,000)
Costs of living Ordinal variable that captures the respondent’s private cost of living, in € per month (1 = 0–500, 2 = 501–1000,
3 = 1001-1500, 4 = 1501–2000, 5 = 2001–2500, 6 = 2501–3000, 7 = 3001–3500, 8 = 3501–4000,
9 = 4001–4500, 10 = 4501–5000, 11 = 5001–10,000, 12 = > 10,000)
Limited liability
company
Dummy variable equal to one if the business is a limited liability company (i.e., UG, GmbH), zero otherwise
Government support Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent received any governmental support during the Coronavirus crisis,
zero otherwise
Region dummies Set of 16 dummy variables that capture the location of the respondent’s business. The dummies refer to the 16
federal states of Germany
Industry dummies Set of 15 dummy variables that capture the main industry of the respondent’s business. Dummies (a) IT, (b)
engineering, (c) business services, (d) training, (e) proof-reading, (f) journalism, (g) culture, (h) event, (i) health
and wellness, (j) tourism, (k) retail, (l) online retail, (m) finance and real-estate, (n) hospitality, and (o) others
Response week
dummies
Set of five dummy variables that capture the week in which the respondent concluded the survey. Dummies refer
to (a) calendar week 15 (06.04.–12.04.), (b) week 16 (13.04.–19.04.), (c) week 17 (20.04.–26.04.), (d) week 18
(27.04.–03.05.), (e) week 19 (04.05.–10.05.)
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4.3 Variables
4.3.1 Dependent variable
Our dependent variable captures the extent of
bootstrapping measures employed by self-employed in-
dividuals. In the survey, we asked respondents whether
they had implemented one or more of the following
measures to preserve liquidity in response to the
COVID-19 crisis: (a) sending payment reminders
(warnings) to customers, (b) delaying payment on in-
voices that they received, (c) reducing tax advances, (d)
reducing health insurance contributions, (e) reducing
commercial rent, and (f) reducing private rent. The
variable “bootstrapping measures” is a count variable
and comprises the number of measures from the
abovementioned list that were employed by the respon-
dent, ranging from 0 to 6.
4.3.2 Independent variables
Our independent variables capture a range of individual,
business, and COVID-19-related variables that might be
related to the use of bootstrapping.
The first set of variables refers to H1a and measures
the direct impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the respon-
dents measured via the venture’s COVID-19 induced
decrease in revenues. We construct a set of dummy
variables indicating (a) a stable or even increased reve-
nue as well as revenue decreases of (b) 100%, (c) 76 to
99%, (d) 51 to 75%, (e) 26 to 50%, and (f) 1 to 25%
(reference category).
To measure H1b, we measure the venture’s solvency
via a range of dummy variables. Specifically, we ask
respondents to indicate how long their businesses would
be able to maintain solvency given their current revenue
and cost situation. The dummy variables are (a) already
insolvent, (b) solvent for 1 to 6 months, (c) solvent for 7
to 12 months, and (d) solvent for more than 12 months
(reference category).
To operationalize H2, we measure respondents’ self-
employment experience by capturing the number of years
that the individual has been self-employed in his or her
current business (H2a). To account for the respondent’s
level of education, we include a dummy variable equal to
one if the respondent received an academic education at a
university and zero otherwise (H2b).
To assess our opportunity cost-related hypotheses
(H3), we capture whether the entrepreneur is working
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Fig. 1 Major events during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany and survey period.Notes: * TCC = total confirmed cases
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full-time or part-time (H3a). We also include a dummy
variable that captures whether the entrepreneur is work-
ing solo or with employees (H3b). Finally, we measure
the respondent’s age using an ordinal variable that is
scaled from 1 (< 30 years) to 5 (> 59 years) (H3c).
4.3.3 Control variables
We include a range of control variables to account for
confounding effects. To capture gender-related differ-
ences, we include a dummy variable that is equal to one
for a female respondent and zero otherwise. To measure
the association between bootstrapping and the propen-
sity for risk-taking, we include a variable that captures
the self-employed respondents’ attitudes toward risk.
The variable ranges from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).
Additionally, we capture each respondent’s household
size (including the respondent in this total). This vari-
able is ordinal and scaled from 1 to “more than 5.”
Furthermore, we consider the businesses’ levels of
digitalization (Bertschek and Erdsiek 2020). We ask
respondents to indicate their business’ level of digitali-
zation on a 5-point Likert scale. Based on this scale, we
construct a dummy variable that is equal to one for
respondents who stated that their businesses possessed
either a high or a very high degree of digitalization.
Since the bootstrapping measure of reducing corporate
rent only applies to self-employed individuals whowork
in an outside office, we include a dummy variable that
captures whether the respondent mostly works from
home.
We include two variables that capture the respon-
dents’ financial situations. First, we capture respon-
dents’ private wealth, which might mitigate the need to
implement bootstrapping measures. Specifically, we re-
fer to the respondents’ assets that could be quickly
liquidated to support the business. Possible responses
ranged from 1 (€0) to 10 (more than €500,000). Second,
we ask respondents to specify their monthly private cost
of living. Possible responses range from 1 (€0–500) to
12 (more than €10,000).
To control for liability-related issues, we capture
whether the respondent’s firm is incorporated as a lim-
ited liability company. For self-employed individuals in
Germany, a limited liability company mainly refers to
the corporation types “UG” and “GmbH.” Finally, we
control for governmental support via a dummy variable
that captures whether a self-employed has received gov-
ernmental support or not.
The response to the COVID-19 crisis differed across
the 16 German federal states. To capture these differ-
ences as well as the more general regional differences
across Germany, we include a set of dummy variables
that identifies the federal state in which the respondents’
business is located. To account for any industry-related
differences, we include a set of 15 dummy variables that
captures the main industry of the respondent’s business.
Finally, the COVID-19 crisis developed rapidly, and the
framework conditions for businesses frequently
changed, for example, regarding government support
and lockdowns. To capture differences related to the
timing of respondents’ completion of the survey, we
include a final set of five dummy variables that capture
the week in which the respondent concluded the survey.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and univariate anal-
yses that provide initial insights into the relationship
between our independent variables and the number of
bootstrapping measures employed.
Regarding our dependent variable “bootstrapping
measures,” the results indicate that each self-employed
individual used an average of 1.4 liquidity measures.
However, this variable is skewed. Out of the 17,046
respondents in our final sample, 4693 (27.5%) did not
use any bootstrapping measures. In contrast, 4987
(29.3%) respondents used one bootstrapping measure,
4351 (25.5%) used two, 2050 (12.0%) used three, 703
(4.1%) used four, 222 (1.3%) used five, and 40 (0.2%)
respondents used all six measures. The most commonly
used measure is reducing tax advances (47.5%, 8104
respondents) of all respondents, followed by reducing
health insurance contributions (32.6%, 5555), sending
payment reminders (25.7%, 4387), paying invoices later
(16.9%, 2887), reducing private rent (9.9%, 1692), and
reducing corporate rent (8.1%, 1376).
The descriptive statistics of our independent vari-
ables show that the category with the highest percentage
of respondents (39.3%) suffered a total loss of revenues
due to COVID-19. Additionally, 24.5% of the respon-
dents reported a revenue decrease of 76–99%, and
16.8% of the respondents reported a decline of 51–
75%. Collectively, 80.6% of the respondents reported
revenue decreases of more than 50%, underlining the
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severe impact of the crisis on the self-employed individ-
uals in our sample. Furthermore, the majority (66.5%) of
the self-employed individuals indicate that they are only
able to maintain solvency for the next 1 to 6 months. As
mentioned above, we also asked respondents if they are
full-time or part-time entrepreneurs and find that 89.2%
are full-time self-employed. In addition, the dummy
variable solo self-employed indicates that most respon-
dents of our sample run their business alone (86.4%).
Finally, our sample consists of 60.5% self-employed
Table 2 Descriptive statistics and comparison of means
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample Full sample Subsamples: bootstrapping measures used
No Yes t/z test
N (observations) 17,056 4693 12,353 17,046
Variables Mean SD Min Max Mean Mean Sig.
Dependent variable
Financial bootstrapping 1.408 1.218 0 6 – – –
Independent variables
Revenue stable/increase 0.002 0.042 0 1 0.004 0.001
Revenue decrease: 100% 0.393 0.488 0 1 0.400 0.391
Revenue decrease: 76–99% 0.245 0.430 0 1 0.200 0.262 ***
Revenue decrease: 51–75% 0.168 0.374 0 1 0.161 0.170
Revenue decrease: 26–50% 0.125 0.330 0 1 0.133 0.121
Revenue decrease: 1–25% (ref.) 0.053 0.224 0 1 0.074 0.045
Solvency: insolvent 0.112 0.315 0 1 0.105 0.114
Solvency: 1–6 months 0.665 0.472 0 1 0.591 0.693 ***
Solvency: 7–12 months 0.131 0.338 0 1 0.149 0.125
Solvency: > 12 months (ref.) 0.092 0.290 0 1 0.154 0.069 ***
Self-employment experience 2.662 1.142 1 5 2.572 2.695 ***
Academic education 0.605 0.489 0 1 0.613 0.602
Full-time SE 0.892 0.310 0 1 0.799 0.927 ***
Solo SE 0.864 0.343 0 1 0.911 0.846 ***
Age: 30–39 0.180 0.384 0 1 0.167 0.184
Age: 40–49 0.277 0.447 0 1 0.248 0.287 *
Age: 50–59 0.369 0.483 0 1 0.369 0.369
Age: > 60 0.138 0.345 0 1 0.167 0.127 *
Age: < 30 (ref.) 0.037 0.189 0 1 0.048 0.033
Control variables
Female 0.525 0.499 0 1 0.571 0.507 ***
Risk attitude 3.048 0.967 1 5 2.966 3.079 ***
Household size 2.195 1.124 1 5 2.149 2.213 ***
High digitalization 0.169 0.375 0 1 0.162 0.172
Mostly works from home 0.479 0.500 0 1 0.481 0.478
Wealth 2.104 1.466 1 10 2.257 2.045 ***
Costs of living 4.151 1.986 1 13 3.636 4.347 ***
Limited liability company 0.041 0.198 0 1 0.030 0.045
Government support 0.644 0.479 0 1 0.518 0.691 ***
Notes: The significance levels displayed in column (7) refer to the results of a t test for ordinal/metric variables and to the results of a z test for
proportions (i.e., dummy variables). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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individuals with an academic background that are be-
tween 50 and 59 years old.
Table 2 also provides initial insights into how these
characteristics vary with regard to the implementation of
bootstrapping measures. Columns 5 and 6 show the
mean values for each variable in the subsample of
individuals who did not implement any bootstrapping
measures (column 5) and the subsample of individuals
who implemented at least one such measure (column 6).
Column 7 displays the results of a t/z test for differences.
Several significant differences emerge.
Regarding the individual characteristics, for exam-
ple, the implementation of bootstrapping measures cor-
responds with lower age, more self-employment expe-
rience, a higher propensity to take risks, a larger house-
hold size, higher cost of living, and lower personal
wealth. Further significant differences emerge regarding
business solvency and the acceptance of government
support.
Table 3 displays pairwise correlations and variance
inflation factors. Overall, Table 3 suggests that
multicollinearity does not seem to severely impact our
results.
5.2 Multivariate analyses
Our dependent variable “bootstrapping measures” is a
count variable and ranges from 0 to 6. Because of the
count nature of our dependent variable, we use a nega-
tive binomial regression model as our main form of
analysis. The results are displayed in Table 4. We enter
our sets of independent variables blockwise and jointly
in column 4. The following interpretations refer to the
full model (column 4).
We find support for our set of necessity hypotheses
(H1), which indicates that the individuals’ severity of
the crisis is associated with an increased amount of
bootstrapping measures (H1a) while a higher amount
of business liquidity is associated with a decreased use
of bootstrap financing measures in crises (H1b). Thus,
the larger the severity of the crisis for the entrepreneurial
venture, the higher the amount of bootstrap financing
activities.
Concerning our human capital hypotheses (H2), we
find ambiguous results. On the one hand, we find sup-
port for a positive relationship between more self-
employment experience and an increased use of boot-
strap financing measures (H2a, p < 0.001). On the other
hand, our results do not speak to H2b, which assumed
that a higher level of education should be associated
with an increased use of bootstrapping.
Finally, our results confirm our opportunity cost hy-
potheses. Specifically, full-time entrepreneurs apply a
larger number of bootstrapping measures (H3a,
p < 0.001). Also, solo self-employment is associated
with a decreased number of bootstrap financing mea-
sures (H3b, p < 0.001). Finally, we find that especially
the group of individuals with an age of over 60 years use
a lesser amount of bootstrapping measures (p < 0.01),
which speaks to the age effect hypothesized in H3c.
Regarding our control variables, the results show that
women, a greater household size, and a larger personal
wealth are associated with a decreased extent of finan-
cial bootstrapping measures used. Also, we find positive
effects for risk attitude, costs of living, and the use of
government support.
5.3 Further analysis
As a further analysis, we disentangle the bootstrapping
measures and analyze the use of each bootstrapping
measure separately as a dependent variable (i.e., (1)
sending payment reminders (warnings) to customers,
(2) paying invoices later, (3) reducing tax advances,
(4) reducing health insurance contributions, (5) reducing
commercial rent, and (6) reducing private rent). Some of
these measures are more COVID-specific than others.
We would tentatively categorize (4) reducing health
insurance contributions, (5) reducing commercial rent,
and (6) reducing private rent as more COVID-specific.
The results of the separate logistic regressions are shown
in Table 5 and reveal some differences.
The results show that the determinants of
bootstrapping identified above differ in their effects
regarding the specific bootstrapping measure used.
While revenue decreases and low levels of business
liquidity show effects with at least five of the six
bootstrapping measures, other determinants such as
self-employment experience are only correlated with
some measures. The former result indicates that the
most heavily affected self-employed individuals try al-
most everything to survive with their businesses. Inter-
estingly, those self-employed individuals with high
levels of experience make a clear distinction between
customers, suppliers, and the state as stakeholders.
While they are more likely than other self-employed
individuals to send payment reminders to their cus-
tomers (Column 1) and to reduce tax advances (Column
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3), they are notmore likely to delay their own payments.
This could be interpreted as a form of solidarity among
entrepreneurs or as a sign of maintaining a functioning
entrepreneurial network and keeping good relations
with suppliers. A similar pattern can be observed with
full-time versus part-time self-employed individuals.
Hence, it seems that entrepreneurial experience and
entrepreneurial commitment do not only influence the
Table 4 Main analysis: Results of a negative binomial regression model with the number of bootstrapping measures used as dependent
variable
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
Statistic Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Control variables
Female −0.055 (0.014)*** − 0.044 (0.015)** − 0.053 (0.014)*** − 0.057 (0.015)***
Risk attitude 0.025 (0.007)*** 0.030 (0.007)*** 0.027 (0.007)*** 0.022 (0.007)**
Household size − 0.011 (0.006) − 0.011 (0.006) − 0.017 (0.006)** − 0.015 (0.006)*
High digitalization 0.033 (0.018) 0.033 (0.018) 0.017 (0.018) 0.020 (0.018)
Mostly works from home 0.002 (0.014) 0.004 (0.014) 0.009 (0.014) 0.017 (0.014)
Wealth − 0.037 (0.006)*** − 0.079 (0.005)*** − 0.081 (0.005)*** − 0.044 (0.006)***
Costs of living 0.065 (0.003)*** 0.066 (0.003)*** 0.055 (0.004)*** 0.052 (0.004)***
Limited liability company 0.085 (0.030)** 0.069 (0.030)* 0.015 (0.031) 0.032 (0.031)
Government support 0.243 (0.015)*** 0.302 (0.015)*** 0.243 (0.015)*** 0.182 (0.016)***
Independent variables
Revenue stable/increase H1a − 0.424 (0.232) − 0.369 (0.232)
Revenue decrease: 100% H1a 0.222 (0.033)*** 0.250 (0.033)***
Revenue decrease: 76–99% H1a 0.315 (0.033)*** 0.323 (0.033)***
Revenue decrease: 51–75% H1a 0.271 (0.034)*** 0.279 (0.034)***
Revenue decrease: 26–50% H1a 0.179 (0.036)*** 0.179 (0.036)***
Revenue decrease: 1–25% (ref.) H1a – –
Solvency: insolvent H1b 0.509 (0.037)*** 0.481 (0.037)***
Solvency: 1–6 months H1b 0.380 (0.032)*** 0.338 (0.032)***
Solvency: 7–12 months H1b 0.218 (0.035)*** 0.182 (0.035)***
Solvency: > 12 months (ref.) H1b – –
Self-employment experience H2a 0.023 (0.006)*** 0.039 (0.007)***
Academic education H2b 0.004 (0.015) 0.024 (0.015)
Full-time SE H3a 0.468 (0.028)*** 0.437 (0.028)***
Solo SE H3b − 0.115 (0.020)*** − 0.123 (0.021)***
Age: 30–39 H3c 0.070 (0.039) 0.055 (0.040)
Age: 40–49 H3c 0.093 (0.039)* 0.054 (0.040)
Age: 50–59 H3c 0.024 (0.038) − 0.034 (0.040)
Age: > 60 H3c − 0.057 (0.041) − 0.133 (0.044)**
Age: < 30 (ref.) H3c – – – –
Region dummies (15) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies (14) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Response week dummies (4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,046 17,046 17,046 17,046
Chi2 2081.619 1722.636 2127.848 2507.913
Pseudo-R2 0.040 0.033 0.041 0.048
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Coeff. coefficient, SE standard error
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extent of bootstrapping but also the type of
bootstrapping.
6 Discussion
6.1 Interpretation of findings
Our results demonstrate that the severity of the crisis is
closely connected to the extent of bootstrapping methods.
This finding is in line with prior research that identifies
liquidity issues as one of several bootstrapping drivers
(e.g., Winborg and Landström 2001; Ebben 2009).
Furthermore, we find that self-employment experi-
ence has a positive effect on the use of bootstrapping
measures. Thus, more experience as a self-employed
provides an individual with greater knowledge of dif-
ferent bootstrapping methods, which in turn increases
the options for them in crises. This finding is in line with
Winborg (2009) but contrasts those of Grichnik et al.
(2014) who find that managerial experience is an im-
portant bootstrapping driver, but entrepreneurial experi-
ence less so. The differences between their findings and
our findings could be due to the different situations and
samples involved. Our sample comprises many solo
self-employed individuals, while their sample mainly
comprises nascent entrepreneurs taking part in a busi-
ness plan competition. Moreover, the entrepreneurs in
our sample face a situation of urgent liquidity problems,
while the entrepreneurs in their sample sought growth
financing. This suggests that the determinants of
bootstrapping are context dependent and differ from
situation to situation. Another interesting finding relates
to the type of bootstrapping measures used. Experienced
self-employed individuals seem less likely than other
self-employed to use bootstrapping measures that do
harm to their entrepreneurial network. Additionally,
we find that highly educated self-employed individuals
do not differ from self-employed individuals with less
education regarding the use of bootstrapping measures.
Again, this finding contrasts the results of Grichnik et al.
(2014) who find that a higher degree of education in-
creases the use of bootstrap financing.
Finally, our results show that additional determinants
can be explained from an opportunity cost perspective.
First, we find that part-time self-employment, solo self-
employment, and higher age are negatively associated
with the number of bootstrapping measures. Due to an
increased uncertainty in the COVID-19 crisis,
opportunity costs increase more for part-time entrepre-
neurs. Therefore, they seem to fight less for the mainte-
nance of their businesses. This finding is in line with
previous literature that explores the relationship of op-
portunity costs and entrepreneurial activity (e.g., Amit
et al. 1995; Kerins et al. 2004; Shane and Venkataraman
2000). Second, the negative effect of solo self-
employment might be explained by a higher emotional
involvement of these entrepreneurs. Third, we show that
older self-employed individuals are less intensively en-
gage in bootstrap financing than younger individuals.
This negative effect is mainly due to the group of self-
employed individuals older than 60 years. A tentative
interpretation for this finding is that these self-employed
individuals have a greater tendency to give up and are
not as motivated as their younger counterparts due to
higher opportunity costs of time. Consequently, they do
not fight as hard as younger self-employed individuals
to keep their businesses alive. This interpretation would
be consistent with prior studies regarding the effects of
age on entrepreneurial motivation (Lévesque and
Minniti 2006). However, our results contrast these of
Kautonen et al. (2014) who show that entrepreneurial
activities increase in the sixties due to lower risks and a
larger resource base of know-how.
Next to the opportunity cost theory, switching cost
theory might partially explain these findings. Parker
(2004) describes that higher switching costs increase the
self-employed individuals’ likelihood to stay with the cur-
rent occupation. In our case, part-time self-employed indi-
viduals might have lower switching costs due to lower
lock-in effects. This finding is reinforced by Gohmann
(2012), who shows that country-level institutions (e.g.,
level of economic freedom) affect switching costs and
the prevalence of self-employment. Furthermore, solo
self-employment also goes along with lower switching
costs since they do not have responsibilities over em-
ployees. Finally, self-employed people who are over
60 years old may soon retire or are already retired, which
potentially reduces switching costs makes them less de-
pendent on bootstrap financing.
Our results also show that acceptance of government
support and bootstrapping are complements and not
substitutes. Controlling for the impact of the crisis and
the individual liquidity situation of the self-employed
individuals, we find that those who engage in
bootstrapping measures also have a greater tendency to
apply for government support. We interpret this finding
as a sign of strong entrepreneurial motivation and argue
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that self-employed individuals who use both
bootstrapping and apply for government support have
a strong motivation to maintain their business through
the crisis.
6.2 Practical implications
Our study shows that self-employment experience has a
positive effect on the use of bootstrapping. This finding
suggests that government training, targeted entrepreneur-
ship education programs, or webinars should focus on
inexperienced entrepreneurs so that these individuals can
be prepared to maintain liquidity in crises. The finding that
government support and the use of bootstrappingmeasures
are complementary also bears policy implications. It seems
that government programs do not seem to crowd out the
motivation of self-employed individuals to use their own
measures to maintain their liquidity.
6.3 Limitations and avenues for further research
The current COVID-19 crisis is an example of a situa-
tion of high uncertainty. When the respondents partici-
pated in our survey, it was unclear how long the crisis
was going to last and how severe it would be. Hence,
our results should be interpreted with great caution and
cannot be generalized to all crisis situations that self-
employed individuals may face. Another limitation con-
cerns the nature of our sample since it comprises a
majority of solo self-employed individuals, which is a
large but specific group of entrepreneurs. They differ
from other entrepreneurs in their financing behavior in
that they rely mostly on internal financing instruments
and that business, private life, and financing overlap to a
large degree. Hence, our results should not be general-
ized to other groups of entrepreneurs, particularly those
having employees and relying on external financing
instruments such as bank loans or venture capital. Fur-
ther research is needed in this regard.
Another important avenue for further researchwould be
to investigate other determinants of bootstrapping in the
COVID-19 crisis. For example, we would expect entre-
preneurial motivation to play an important role. A signif-
icant share of solo self-employed individuals start their
businesses out of necessity (De Vries et al. 2020) and are
dependent self-employed (Román et al. 2011). Past re-
search shows that necessity motivates entrepreneurial be-
havior and strategy (Block et al. 2015). Another determi-
nant could be the social capital of solo self-employed
individuals. Due to the general importance of social net-
works for entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial financing,
we would expect these networks to have strong effects
(Seghers et al. 2012). Finally, future research should also
analyze performance effects and investigate whether and
how bootstrapping in the COVID-19 crisis impacts long-
term entrepreneurial performance and survival (Miao et al.
2017; Vanacker et al. 2011).
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